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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STANLEY CLARK RADFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 48553-2021, 48554-2021,
48555-2021, 48556-2021, &
48557-2021
Shoshone County Case Nos.
CR-2014-2455, CR-2016-207,
CR40-19-218, CR40-20-1411, &
CR40-20-1560
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.

Was Radford’s waiver of his right to appeal the sentences imposed in Case Nos. 48556
and 48557 knowing, intelligent, and voluntary?

2.

Has Radford failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in revoking
his probation and executing the underlying sentences in Case Nos. 48553, 48554, and
48555?

3.

Even if he had preserved his right to appeal the district court’s sentencing determinations
in Case Nos. 48556 and 48557, has Radford failed to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion in imposing those sentences?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a consolidated appeal which includes multiple underlying criminal cases which
were resolved pursuant to a global resolution plea agreement. Ultimately, the district court
revoked probation and executed the underlying sentences in Cases No. 48553, 48554, and 48555,
and imposed sentence upon the new convictions in Case Nos. 48556 and 48557. The underlying
facts and procedure of these cases prior to the November 2020 global resolution and subsequent
sentencing determinations made by the district court is set forth below:
Case No. 48553; CR-2014-2455
In December 2014, police responded to the scene of a report of a violent domestic
dispute. (#48553 Exhibits, p.36.) There, Radford’s girlfriend told police that after an argument,
Radford, who had since left the residence with his girlfriend’s purse, threw her to the ground,
dragged her around the kitchen, chased her around the house with a hammer, and punched holes
in the wall. (Id.) The next night, officers returned in response to a report about a male subject
attempting to enter the residence. (Id.) Officer arrived and located and arrested Radford in the
back yard. (Id.) Officers located marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia on
Radford’s person. (Id.) A subsequent search of Radford’s vehicle recovered various Schedule
II and IV pills. (Id.)
The state charged Radford with aggravated assault, methamphetamine possession, and
two counts of possession of a Scheduled II controlled substance.

(#48553 R., pp.61-63.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Radford pled guilty to methamphetamine possession, and the state
agreed to dismiss the other counts, as well as charges in a separate case. (#48553 R., pp.65, 108112.)

The district court imposed a unified four-year sentence with two years fixed, but

suspended the sentence and placed Radford on probation for two years. (#48552 R., pp.97-106.)
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Based upon Radford’s commission of new criminal offenses, the state filed a motion for
probation violation. (#48553 R., pp.125-126.) The district court revoked Radford’s probation
and retained jurisdiction. (#48553 R., pp.178-182.) In November 2017, at the conclusion of the
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Radford back on supervised probation.
(#48553 R., pp.189-194) About a year later, in October 2018, the state filed another motion for
probation violation. (#48553 R., pp.198-202.) The district court revoked probation and again
retained jurisdiction. (#48553 R., pp.272-274.) In April 2020, following the second period of
retained jurisdiction, the district court again placed Radford on supervised probation. (#48553
R., pp.286-289.)
Case No. 48554; CR-2016-207
In February 2016, an officer the Shoshone County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office
observed Radford on a closed circuit monitor. (#48554 Conf. Exhibits, p.63.) An employee at
the prosecutor’s office informed the officer that Radford had an active arrest warrant. (Id.) The
officer arrested Radford, searched his person, and recovered a glass pipe containing a burned
black residue. (Id.) At the jail, a more thorough search revealed a plastic bag containing
methamphetamine. (Id.)
The state charged Radford with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
(#48554 R., pp.53-55.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Radford pled guilty to the

methamphetamine charge and the state dismissed the paraphernalia charge. (#48554 R., pp.139,
152-57.) The district court imposed a unified four-year sentence with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (#48554 R., pp.146-151.)
In November 2017, at the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction in both this and
Radford’s prior case, the district court placed Radford on supervised probation. (#48554 R.,
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pp.168-176.) Also, as in the prior case, the state filed a motion for probation violation in
October 2018, ultimately resulting in the district court retaining jurisdiction again, and then
Radford being placed back on supervised probation in April 2020. (#48554 R., pp.177-181, 231233, 244-247.)
Case No. 48555; CR-40-19-218
In February 2019, Radford drove his vehicle into another vehicle which had been in a
rollover accident. (#47566 1 Conf. Exhibits, p.10.) Radford exited his vehicle and began walking
away, while an officer attending to the rollover accident told him to return to his vehicle. (Id.)
The officer learned that Radford had an active felony warrant. (Id.) Radford resisted the
officer’s attempts to arrest and search him. (#47566 Conf. Exhibits, pp.10-11.) The officer
recovered a cylindrical object from Radford’s person, but Radford slapped it away and tried to
stomp on it with his foot. (#47566 Conf. Exhibits, p.11.)

Officers eventually recovered the

object, which contained methamphetamine, a glass pipe from Radford’s person, and other
paraphernalia from Radford’s vehicle. (Id.)
The state charged Radford with felony attempted concealment of evidence,
methamphetamine possession, possession of drug paraphernalia, and obstructing an officer.
(#47566 R., pp.80-82.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Radford pled guilty to attempted

destruction of evidence, and the state agreed to dismiss the other charges. (#47566 R., pp.115124.) The district court imposed a unified three-year sentence with one year fixed, and retained

1

Docket No. 47566 is the case number associated with Radford’s prior appeal from his judgment
of conviction in Shoshone Case No. CR-40-19-218. The Idaho Supreme Court ordered the
record in the present appeal to be augmented with the clerk’s record and transcript from Case
No. 47566, in which Radford challenged his sentence. (#48555 R., p.13.)
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jurisdiction. 2 (#47566 R., pp.126-131.) In April 2020, at the conclusion of the period of retained
jurisdiction, the district court, as with Radford’s previous two cases discussed above, placed
Radford on supervised probation. (#48555 R., pp.59-66.)
Case No. 48556; CR-40-20-1411
In September 2020, while on supervised probation in each of three of the above-discussed
cases, an officer stopped Radford’s vehicle for failing to stop at a stop sign. (#48556 R., p.11.)
Radford consented to a search of the vehicle, pursuant to which officers recovered
methamphetamine, paraphernalia, and two pills.

(Id.)

The state charged Radford with

possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (#48556 R., pp.37-38.) While those
charges were pending, the state moved to revoke Radford’s bond for failing to appear at a
required urinalysis test. (#48556 R., pp.60-61.)
Case No. 48557; CR40-20-1560
In October 2020, while he had active warrants in the above-discussed four prior cases, an
officer arrested Radford as he was getting into a vehicle at his residence. (#48557 R., p.12.) A
search of Radford’s person revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, including a
scale. (#48557 R., pp.12-13.) The state charged Radford with possession of methamphetamine
with intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (#48557 R., pp.58-60.)

2

In February 2021, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated this sentence because the imposed threeyear unified term exceeded the statutory maximum for attempted concealment of evidence. State
v. Radford, 2021 WL 684397 (Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished). It does not appear that Radford has
yet been re-sentenced in this case, which, as discussed above, has tracked concurrently with
Radford’s prior two criminal cases through periods of retained jurisdiction and supervised
probation. See Idaho Data Repository, State v. Radford, Shoshone County District Court Case
No. CR-40-19-218.
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Global Resolution
Pursuant to a global resolution in these five cases, Radford pled guilty to
methamphetamine possession in both the September 2020 and October 2020 cases (which
included removing the “intent to deliver” component from the October 2020 methamphetamine
charge), and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in those two cases, and in a
separate unrelated case. (#48557 Tr. 3, p.5, L.12 – p.6, L.18; p.7, Ls.1-8; #48577 R., p.65.)
Radford also admitted violating his probation in CR-2014-2455 (Case No. 48553), CR-2016-207
(Case No. 48554), and CR-40-19-218 (Case No. 48555). (#48557 Tr., p.12, L.5 – p.13, L.16.)
The parties agreed that any imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation in these
cases would run concurrently with the sentences in the two newer cases. (#48557 Tr., p.6, Ls.2123.) Otherwise, the parties were free to argue for any sentence. (#48557 Tr., p.6, Ls.23-25.)
Pursuant to the plea agreement, Radford also agreed to waive his right to appeal his
convictions and sentences in the new September 2020 and October 2020 cases. The written
pretrial settlement offer, signed by both Radford and his attorney, included a checked box
indicating “Defendant’s agreement” to “Waive appeal as of right as to conviction and sentence.”
(#48557 R., p.65.)

In relaying the plea agreement to the district court at the change of

plea/sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that pursuant to the plea agreement, Radford
“will…waive his right to appeal the conviction and the sentence.” (#48557 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.)
Radford informed the court that he agreed with the prosecutor’s recitation of the plea agreement.
(#48557 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-12.)

3

The only transcript the state cites to in this brief is the 11/30/20 transcript from Case No.
48557, which contains the description of the global plea resolution, Radford’s guilty pleas, and
the sentencing.
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Though he had twice already had the opportunity to participate in rider programming,
Radford recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction on all five cases. (#48557 Tr.,
p.19, Ls.7-15.) The state recommended that the court revoke Radford’s probation and execute
the corresponding underlying sentences in the three older cases, and impose concurrent unified
seven-year sentences with three years fixed in the two new cases. (#48557 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-11.)
The district court revoked Radford’s probation and executed the underlying sentences in
the three older cases, and imposed concurrent unified five-year sentences with two years fixed in
each of the two new cases. (#48557 Tr., p.26, L.11 – p.27, L.5; #48557 R., pp.71-76.) Radford
timely appealed in all five cases. (#48557 R., pp.77-80.)
ARGUMENT
I.
Radford’s Waiver Of His Right To Appeal His Sentences Imposed In Case Nos. 48556 And
48557 Was Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary
A.

Introduction
Pursuant to the global plea agreement, Radford waived his right to appeal the district

court’s sentencing determination in Case Nos. 48556 (CR-40-20-1411) and 48557 (CR40-201560). This Court should therefore decline to consider Radford’s argument that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion in those cases.
B.

Radford’s Waiver Of His Right To Appeal His Sentences Imposed In Case Nos. 48556
And 48557 Was Validly Entered
Defendants may waive their right to appeal as a term of a plea agreement. State v.

Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2012). Such a waiver is enforceable if the record
shows that it was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,
496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245 (2006). Appellate courts employ the same analysis used to determine
7

the validity of any guilty plea when evaluating the enforceability of a waiver of the right to
appeal provided as part of a plea agreement. State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719,
720 (1994).
When the validity of a guilty plea is challenged on appeal, the appellate court conducts an
independent review of the record. State v. Hawkins, 115 Idaho 719, 720, 769 P.2d 596, 597 (Ct.
App. 1989). Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1)
whether the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the nature of the
charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to a jury trial, to confront accusers, and to refrain from self-incrimination; and (3) whether
the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34,
557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). If the evidence is conflicting as to the circumstances surrounding the
guilty plea, the appellate court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact supported by
substantial evidence. Hawkins, 115 Idaho at 720-721, 769 P.2d at 597-598.
In this case, as noted above, the written pretrial settlement offer, signed by both Radford
and his attorney, included a checked box indicating “Defendant’s agreement” to “Waive appeal
as of right as to conviction and sentence.” (#48557 R., p.65.) In relaying the plea agreement to
the district court at the change of plea/sentencing hearing, the prosecutor specifically stated that
pursuant to the plea agreement, Radford “will…waive his right to appeal the conviction and the
sentence.” (#48557 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-20.) Radford informed the court that he agreed with the
prosecutor’s recitation of the plea agreement. (#48557 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-12.)
On appeal, Radford points to other portions of the pretrial settlement offer and change of
plea hearing that, he claims, do not reflect an appellate waiver. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-14.)
The bottom of the settlement offer contains a numbered list of rights waived by acceptance of the
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offer, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to appeal the
conviction and sentence. (#48557 R., p.65.) While this form is signed by Radford and his
attorney, a checkbox next to the acceptance and waiver of rights is unchecked.

(See id.)

However, this does not overcome the previously-summarized evidence of the validity of the
waiver. Considering this other evidence, it is clear that this box being left unchecked was an
oversight. Radford and his attorney signed directly below the acceptance and list of waived
rights. (Id.) The record is clear that Radford did accept the state’s offer, and consequently
waived his rights to a jury trial, to the presumption of innocence, to confront witnesses, to
subpoena witnesses, and to appeal his conviction and sentence. Radford’s argument that he did
not accept the plea agreement or waive these rights is without merit.
Radford also points out that the judgments of conviction in the two newer cases contain a
standard “Notice of Right to Appeal,” which informed Radford that he has the right to appeal the
judgment, and which includes an unchecked line in front of an entry indicating an appellate
waiver. (#48556 R., p.77; #48557 R., p.75.) However, the judgments of convictions, entered
after Radford entered his guilty pleas, say nothing about whether the appellate waiver associated
with those pleas was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See State v. Haws, 167 Idaho 471,
478–79, 472 P.3d 576, 583–84 (2020) (“a misstatement by the district court cannot, by itself,
invalidate a plea agreement which is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”).
Finally, Radford points out that during the change of plea colloquy, while describing the
rights Radford was waiving by pleading guilty, the district court did not mention an appellate
waiver. (See Tr., p.9, Ls.11-21.) As Radford notes (Appellant’s brief, p.13), this omission
violated I.C.R. 11(d)(3), which requires a district court to ask the defendant if he is aware of any
existing appellate waiver before the defendant enters his guilty plea. While a court’s failure to
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comply with I.C.R. 11(d)(3) may constitute evidence relevant to a determination of whether an
appellate waiver is valid, the language of the rule itself does not provide, as a remedy, the
striking of the appellate waiver from the plea agreement if the rule is not followed. Instead, as
noted above, the validity of an appellate waiver does not depend on compliance with I.C.R.
11(d)(3), but upon a determination of whether the waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made. Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245. Here, the record demonstrates
that the waiver was valid because the prosecutor told the court that Radford agreed to waive his
appellate rights, Radford’s counsel agreed with this representation; and because the pretrial
settlement offer, signed by both Radford and his counsel, included a checked box specifically
indicating that Radford waiving his right “as to conviction and sentence.”
Because the record demonstrates that Radford’s appellate waiver was knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered, Radford is precluded from appealing the sentences. 4
II.
Radford Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Revoking
His Probation And Executing The Underlying Sentences In Case Nos. 48553, 48554, And 48855
A.

Introduction
Radford contends that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his

probation and executed his underlying sentences in Case Nos. 48553, 48554, and 48855.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-17.) However, a review of the record reveals that the district court
acted well within its discretion to revoke Radford’s probations in light of Radford’s criminal
history and previous failures to comply with the terms of community supervision.

4

As Radford notes (Appellant’s brief, p.14 n.5), the appellate waiver, if it was validly entered,
applies only to the district court’s sentencing determinations in the two newer cases, not its
decision to revoke Radford’s probation in the three older cases.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“‘[T]he decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a violation is within the

discretion of the district court.’” State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017)
(quoting State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)). In
determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). A
decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court
abused its discretion. Id. at 798, 302 P.3d at 1071 (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326,
834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992)).
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (citing
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Revoke Radford’s Probations
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Radford’s probation and

ordered the underlying sentences to be executed. In reviewing the propriety of a probation
revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke
probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). “In
determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting the
objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v. Upton,
11

127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).

If the court

reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not achieving its
rehabilitative purpose, then probation may be revoked. See State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452,
454-455, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112-1113 (1977). Contrary to Radford’s assertions on appeal, the
record shows the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his probation.
Prior to making its global sentencing determination in the five pending cases, the district
court specifically referenced the relevant sentencing objectives. (#48557 Tr., p.23, Ls.17-25.)
As the court correctly observed, Radford had “numerous opportunities to take advantage of
rehabilitative programs here in the community and in the custody of the Department of
Corrections.” (#48557 Tr., p.24, Ls.2-5.) The court also compassionately recognized that
Radford was himself a victim of his addiction, and noted that through its review of Radford’s
history, it was “familiar with the good Stanley Radford.” (#48557 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-8, 21-23.) The
court further acknowledged that there were people in the community willing to stand by Radford,
and who had known him “as the hardworking, law abiding Stanley Radford.” (#48557 Tr., p.24,
L.23 – p.25, L.1.)

The court also specifically expressed that it had considered retaining

jurisdiction in Radford’s cases for the third time. (#48557 Tr., p.25, L.21 – p.26, L.1.)
However, ultimately, in light of Radford’s continuing failure to abide with the law while
on community supervision, and his two prior opportunities to participate in rider programs, the
court stated that it was not inclined to retrain jurisdiction for a third time (#48557 Tr., p.25, Ls.213; p.25, L.21 – p.26, L.1), and instead revoked probation and executed the underlying sentences
in Case Nos. 48553, 48554, And 48855. In light of these prior opportunities referenced by the
district court, and the court’s thoughtful explanation of its decision-making process, Radford has
failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

12

On appeal, Radford contends simply that he desires rehabilitation, was not committing
thefts or violent crimes, and was a productive member of the community. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.15-17.) However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the district court disregarded
any of these things, and instead, as noted above, the court specifically discussed Radford’s good
qualities and struggles with addiction; and, as discussed below, exercised restraint in imposing
sentence in Radford’s more recent two cases, indicating an acknowledgment and consideration
of the mitigating factors present in this case.
The district court’s decision not to provide Radford a third opportunity to participate in
rider programming, and to instead execute the underlying sentences upon the revocation of
Radford’s probation, was entirely reasonable in the circumstances of this case. Radford has
therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.
III.
Even If He Had Preserved His Right To Appeal The District Court’s Sentencing Determinations
In Case Nos. 48556 And 48557, Radford Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion In Imposing Those Sentences
A.

Introduction
As argued above, Radford waived his right, through the plea agreement, to appeal from

the district court’s sentencing determinations in Case Nos. 48556 and 48557. Nonetheless,
Radford contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentences in those cases
rather than retaining jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18.) However, a review of the record
reveals that the district court acted well within its discretion, considering Radford’s criminal
history and other relevant factors, to decline to provide Radford another opportunity on a rider
program and to instead impose a concurrent unified five year-sentences with two years fixed.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,
577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). The
trial court’s decision to impose a particular term of probation is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Mummert, 98 Idaho at 454, 566 P.2d at 1112; see
also State
Cross,
- --- - -v.
-- - - 105 Idaho 494,
495-96, 670 P.2d 901, 902-903 (1983).
As noted above, in evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate
court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Herrera, 164 Idaho at 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160
(citing Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 194.)
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the
period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
14

the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference to the trial judge,
this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might
differ.’” State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
As discussed above, the district court referenced and applied the relevant sentencing
factors and acknowledged Radford’s positive qualifies and struggles with addictions prior to
imposing sentence. In imposing sentence in Radford’s two newer cases, the court also expressly
rejected the state’s recommendation of concurrent unified seven-year sentences, and instead
imposed lesser five-year unified sentences with two years fixed. (#48557 Tr., p.26, Ls.5-7; p.26,
L.25 - p.27, L.5.) Imposing such sentences, rather than retaining jurisdiction for a third time as
Radford recommended, was entirely reasonable considering Radford’s criminal history and
previous failures to comply with law and with the rules of community supervision. Indeed, in
light of the continuous timing of Radford’s crimes, and the number of plea agreements involving
multiple charges and cases, the state submits that Radford was fortunate to have so many of his
sentences run concurrently, and to have so many charges dismissed as part of various plea
agreements.
Even assuming that his appellate waiver was invalid, Radford has failed to demonstrate
that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. This Court must therefore affirm the
district court’s sentencing determinations.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Radford’s judgments of conviction;
the district court’s decision to revoke probation and execute the underlying sentences, and the
court’s sentencing determinations.
DATED this 12th day of October, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of October, 2021, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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